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Immanence and Autobiography: Gilles
Deleuze’s a life and Sarah Kofman’s
autobiogriffure*
Jean Emily P. Tan
Abstract: How does the “I” of autobiography relate to the “I” of the
philosopher? Is there an alternative to conceiving of this relation in
terms of the opposition between the particular to the universal? This
essay offers Deleuze’s notion of immanence as a fruitful way of
approaching this question by staging an encounter between Sarah
Kofman’s autobiographical work, Rue Ordener, Rue Labat, and Gilles
Deleuze’s “Immanence: A Life.” In this textual encounter, Kofman’s
autobiography is interpreted in light of Deleuze’s concept of
“immanence” and Deleuze’s notion of “a life” is explicated through its
application to autobiography.
Keywords: Kofman, Deleuze, immanence, autobiography

S

arah Kofman (1934–1994) and Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) are not two
names that are often linked to one another, but they were
contemporaries. Kofman—a French philosopher known for her books
on Nietzsche and Freud (and in the English-speaking world, particularly for
her book on Freud’s account of femininity, The Enigma of Woman 1—was born
nine years after Deleuze and died the year before his death.
Kofman has acknowledged her indebtedness to Deleuze in two of her
books on Nietzsche; in Explosion II (Les enfants de Nietzsche), Kofman notes
that it was Deleuze’s course on the Genealogy of Morals, “which she followed
when she was studying for the ‘agrégation’ examination, that first inspired

* This essay was delivered at the 6th Deleuze & Guattari Studies in Asia International
Conference/Philosophical Association of the Philippines National Conference held at the Ateneo de
Naga University in July 2018.
1 Sarah Kofman, The Enigma of Woman: Woman in Freud’s Writings, trans. by Catherine
Porter (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1980).
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her interest in Nietzsche.” 2 Notably, it was Deleuze who took over the
supervision of Kofman’s dissertation on “The Concept of Culture in
Nietzsche and Freud” in 1971, when her mentor, Jean Hyppolite, died in 1968.
While it would be interesting to undertake a study of the lines of influence
connecting these two thinkers, 3 in this essay, I wish to take the Deleuze and
Kofman connection to a different direction. By staging an encounter between
two of their texts, I hope to show that the Deleuzian concept of immanence,
interpreted in the light of Kofman’s notion and practice of autobiography, can
shed light on the question of the relation between life and text.
I first discovered Kofman through her autobiographical work, Rue
Ordener, Rue Labat, written in the last year of her life. A gem of a memoir about
her childhood during and after the Nazi occupation of France, this slim
book—written with such sparse simplicity, as if memory were pared down
to nothing but the essential—begins with the arrest of her father, Rabbi Berek
Kofman, who was later killed in a concentration camp, and narrates how
Sarah and her mother were saved, thanks to a Christian woman who hid them
in her apartment. In “saving” her, the woman, whom she calls Mémé, not
only distanced her from her Jewish identity but also sought to take—and it
seems, succeeded in taking—her mother’s place.
One of the interesting, difficult, and confounding aspects of
Kofman’s work is the manner in which autobiography is so undeniably
implicated in her corpus at multiple levels. In her interpretations of various
philosophers, she uncovers suppressed or unrecognized autobiographical
aspects of these authors’ works, arguing for the status of these texts as
autobiographical fictions. We can say that there is nothing particularly
remarkable about such a psychoanalytic mode of reading. But what makes
Kofman’s readings particularly enigmatic—and also problematic—is that her
readings of other thinkers serve not only to unmask the autobiographical
aspect of their texts, but are also imprinted by her own autobiographical
signatures, so to speak. She reads texts in a way that it is impossible to ignore
the motifs that run through her own biography.
This fact was remarked upon by Jacques Derrida, in his memorial
essay on Sarah Kofman. In the following passage, Derrida is revisiting
Kofman’s first book The Childhood of Art (L’Enfance de l’art) in light of her
succeeding works:
… this first book—so rich, so sharp, so perfectly lucid in
its reading of Freud—was also the childhood of the art,
2 Duncan Large, Translator’s Introduction to Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor,
trans. by Duncan Large (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), x.
3 For instance, it would be worth examining how these two thinkers make use of and
are connected by the concept of “becoming-woman.”
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the child’s play, of Sarah Kofman. An autobiographical
anamnesis, an autobiogriffure. All the places—of the
father, of the mothers, of the substitution of mothers, of
laughter and life as works of art—were there already
acknowledged, rigorously assigned. 4
What do we make of the incursions of the autobiographical in Kofman’s
philosophical texts? It might be all too easy to dismiss her work as being too
confessional, as mere hysterical projections of a woman, but there is
something courageous and transgressive in the way in which Kofman refused
to disavow the particularity of her voice for the sake of attaining the
anonymity of the authorial philosophical voice.
Kofman forces us to think about the relation between life and text,
and specifically between autobiography and philosophy. How does the “I”
of autobiography relate to the “I” of the philosopher? Is there an alternative
way of conceiving this relation other than by opposing the universal to the
particular? Other than relegating the autobiographical to the sphere of the
contingent and merely personal?
In this essay, I would like to inquire whether Deleuze’s notion of
immanence might offer us a fruitful way of answering this question. I propose
to do this by staging an encounter between two texts, both written at or near
the end of each author’s corpus—Sarah Kofman’s Rue Ordener, Rue Labat 5 and
Gilles Deleuze’s “Immanence: A Life.” 6 In this textual encounter, I shall be
doing several things simultaneously: (1) read “Immanence: A Life” closely,
(2) read Kofman’s autobiography using Deleuze’s concept of “immanence,”
and (3) explicate Deleuze’s notion of “a life” through its application to
autobiography.

The Transcendental Field
Deleuze’s final essay, “Immanence: A Life,” is the posing of the
question of “a transcendental field” that leads to the concept of pure
immanence. As a heuristic device, I would like to suggest that one could
understand Deleuze’s metaphysical intent (his anti-transcendental
metaphysics) by thinking of his project as an “epoche”—in the
phenomenological sense—a reduction, but not of objects to the constituting
4 Jacques Derrida, “Introduction,” in Enigmas: Essays on Sarah Kofman, ed. by Penelope
Deutscher and Kelly Oliver (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 22.
5 Sarah Kofman, Rue Ordener, Rue Labat, trans. by Ann Smock (Lincoln and London:
University of Nebraska Press, 1996).
6 Gilles Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life,” in Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life, trans. by
Anne Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2001), 25–33.
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consciousness, but to something nearer, more immediate than even selfconsciousness. In the following passage, Deleuze refers to the transcendental
field as being irreducible to the mutually constituting relation of subject and
object (of the transcendental ego and the transcendentally constituted object).
He is effecting an epoche that goes beyond consciousness, so to speak.
Consciousness becomes a fact only when a subject is
produced at the same time as its object, both being
outside the field and appearing as “transcendents.”
Conversely, as long as consciousness traverses the
transcendental field at an infinite speed everywhere
diffused, nothing is able to reveal it. It is expressed, in
fact, only when it is reflected on a subject that refers it to
objects. That is why the transcendental field cannot be
defined by the consciousness that is coextensive with it,
but removed from any revelation. 7
But if it is “removed from any revelation,” how can we conceive of the
transcendental field? If consciousness can only think of objects that it can
represent to itself, and if the transcendental field cannot be thought—“cannot
be defined by the consciousness that is coextensive with it”—then I suppose
consciousness would have to conceive of the transcendental field by creating
or finding a kind of inadequation with the field. To ask about the
transcendental field, I take it, is to consider the field of possibility of thought,
which is to say—to consider that there might be other possibilities of
understanding, other formations of experience, other combinations entities,
other doors, other windows to becoming.
How do we know this is possible? How can we know that there are
other possibilities of thought? I would suggest that it is a matter of pursuing
avenues of inadequation. It’s a matter of teasing the snags of existence in
order to unravel some portion of its fabric, in order to come to another layer,
another plane of possibility. We listen for, we follow the restlessness and
uneasiness we might feel, that signals to us other registers of being than the
one we have come to inhabit. We put our ears on the ground and listen for a
different beat. We follow our affects. In other words, the “beyond
consciousness” of what I would call the Deleuzian epoche is not so much a
going beyond as it is a “getting beneath” consciousness.
This is why the question of the transcendental field leads directly to
the concept of immanence:

7

Ibid., 26.
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The transcendent is not the transcendental. Were it not
for consciousness, the transcendental field would be
defined as a pure plane of immanence, because it eludes
all transcendence of the subject and of the object. 8
and the concept of immanence, directly to “a life”:
No more than the transcendental field is defined by
consciousness can the plane of immanence be defined by
a subject or an object that is able to contain it.
We will say of pure immanence that is is A LIFE,
and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the
immanent that is in nothing is itself a life. 9 ….
… The transcendental field is defined by a plane
of immanence, and the plane of immanence by a life. 10

A Life from the Individual to the Singular
A life refers to thrumming life, faint life, buzzing, or somnolent life,
but a life here—life sensed, life felt, life recognized as it flares (or dims), but
not contained by subjects (of consciousness) in objects (known) or abstracted
and projected to a transcendent beyond. The indefinite article “a” is crucial
here. “A life” here is conceived neither in terms of the organic unity of a
body 11 (with determinate boundaries) nor in terms of a universal life force—
neither this life nor life in general, but a life. The phrase retains the index of the
singular that is at the same time indeterminate.
In order to illuminate what he means by “a life,” Deleuze resorts to
an example from literature:
What is immanence? A life … No one has described
what a life is better than Charles Dickens, if we take the
indefinite article as an index of the transcendental. A
disreputable man, a rogue, held in contempt by
everyone, is found as he lies dying. Suddenly, those
taking care of him manifest an eagerness, respect, even
love, for his slightest sign of life. Everybody bustles
Ibid., 26.
Ibid., 27.
10 Ibid., 28.
11 This is in contrast, for instance, to Aristotle’s definition of the living body in the De
Anima—although it has to be remarked that even for Aristotle, the “primary definition” of life is
still indeterminate: the being-at-work of an organic body as potency.
8
9
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about to save him, to the point where, in his deepest
coma, this wicked man himself senses something soft
and sweet penetrating him. 12

This is crucial—that reduced to “his slightest sign of life,” stripped of power
and his defining characteristics, it is not only that the people around him are
able to recognize something that they respond to with “eagerness, respect,
even love,” but that the man himself “senses”—feels —“something soft and
sweet penetrating him.” His life is his and not his, him and not him,
emanating from him, coursing through him, but also penetrating him. The
dying and the saviors both are able to enter and sink into a plane of
immanence by virtue of a pathos of dispossession that is more radical even
than renunciation. It allows beatitude and empathy to meet: the beatitude of
one and empathy from others, precisely when the one, the individual, gives
way to a life—an impersonal yet singular life:
Between his life and his death, there is a moment that is
only that of a life playing with death. The life of the
individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular
life that releases a pure event freed from the accidents of
internal and external life, that is, from the subjectivity
and objectivity of what happens: a “Homo tantum” with
whom everyone empathizes and who attains a sort of
beatitude. It is a haecceity no longer of individuation but
of singularization: a life of pure immanence, neutral,
beyond good and evil, for it was only the subject that
incarnated it in the midst of things that made it good or
bad. The life of such individuality fades away in favor of
the singular life immanent to a man who no longer has a
name, though he can be mistaken for no other. A
singular essence, a life …. 13
What does this mean? How can a life be both impersonal and yet singular?
What is the difference between individuality and singularity? Between
individual life and a life as pure immanence?
I hope to develop an interpretation of this notion by reading Sarah
Kofman’s autobiography, situating this within her own conception of the
practice of autobiography, as an example of this movement from
individuality to singularity. My working hypothesis is that Sarah Kofman’s

12
13

Deleuze, “Immanence,” 28.
Ibid., 28–29.
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autobiography, Rue Ordener, Rue Labat, can be understood by applying
Deleuze’s concept of immanence; and that conversely, applying Deleuze’s
categories in the interpretation of Kofman would offer a good way of
illuminating what is possibly meant by Deleuze’s notion of “a life.”

A Life and Kofman’s Autobiography
How could an autobiography be useful in illuminating the concept
of “a life”—supposed to be indeterminate and impersonal—when the act of
writing about one’s life fixes, rather than strips away, the “accidents of
internal and external life,” recounts, rather than escapes, “the subjectivity and
objectivity” of what happens?
I suggest that it is a matter of placing Kofman and Deleuze on the
same plane, of reading Kofman in a Deleuzian fashion, which is to say, from
the perspective of the rhizome rather than of the tree. 14 From the arboreal
schema, the question of the philosophical significance of the philosopher’s
autobiography would be posed in this way: What is the universal significance
of the life of the individual thinker? To the extent that it does have (or is
presumed to have) a philosophical significance, wouldn’t it mean either (A)
that the philosopher’s life is reduced to the universalizable traits (marks) it
possesses? Wouldn’t one end up turning the individual’s life into a model (an
example or an exemplar) of the universal or at least of a particular type—or,
in the Hegelian mold, as a moment in the development of the Idea? Wouldn’t
one have to reject (or transform) the contingencies of individual life in order
to do so?
Or (B) the alternative in this arboreal reckoning—which the female
philosopher is particularly vulnerable to—would be to disregard the
philosophical significance of her autobiography and the autobiographical
aspects of her work, and to dismiss her philosophical work for being merely
(or too) autobiographical.
In both cases, the philosophical significance of autobiography is
essentially negative—the particular perspective embodied by the
philosopher’s life, unless purified of whatever in it is contingent and
accidental, serves only to undermine the universality and objectivity of the
philosopher’s thought.
And in both cases, autobiography is construed as an account of
individual, i.e., individuated, particular life. Individuation finds its bearings
in its relation to the kind, the scheme of classification. The individual is
situated within a field of determinate objects and events. Here, the
14 See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia, trans. by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press,
1987), 3–25.
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individual’s life is the life actualized in the “accidents of external and internal
life.” 15
From this perspective, namely, the perspective of individual life, one
might read Rue Ordener, Rue Labat as a memoir in the genre of Holocaust
literature. Sarah Kofman was one of the generation of children who were able
to survive the war because they were hidden by their Christian saviors. One
could read her autobiography as a historical document; aggregated with
similar accounts, it gives a picture of what the survivors of the Holocaust
suffered as children and continue to suffer. On the basis of such accounts, we
could generalize the effects of war, of genocide, of displacement, of religious
intolerance.
What would it mean to read Kofman’s autobiographic writings
otherwise? What would it mean to read Rue Ordener, Rue Labat as a memoir
not of an individual but of a singular life?
First, let us note that the difference between the individual and the immanent,
singular life does not consist in the difference between external and internal
events. It does not consist in the difference between objective and subjective,
as both are already borne by a life flowing “everywhere” and “in all [its]
moments”:
A life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given
living subject goes through and that are measured by
given lived objects: an immanent life carrying with it the
events or singularities that are merely actualized in
subjects and objects. This indefinite life does not itself
have moments, close as they may be one to another, but
only between-times, between-moments; it doesn’t just
come about or come after but offers the immensity of an
empty time where one sees the event yet to come and
already happened, in the absolute of an immediate
consciousness. 16
So on the side of immanence are the “events and singularities” carried by a
life; and on the side of the individual life (the life of a “given living subject”)
are the subjects and objects in which these singularities are actualized. It is
not a question of pitting these “sides” against one another, but of descending
from the level of discrete, individuated, existents (subjects and objects both)
to the indeterminate, to the diffuse intimations of the virtual by catching sight
of the in-between.

15
16

Deleuze, “Immanence,” 28.
Ibid., 29.
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But how is this operation to be done? How do we shift gears, so to
speak, from the level of individuality to that of singular, immanent life? In
other words, how does one read Kofman’s autobiography as a memoir of a
singular life? The following passage is instructive here:
The singularities and the events that constitute a life
coexist with the accidents of the life that corresponds to
it, but they are neither grouped nor divided in the same
way. They connect with one another in a manner entirely
different from how individuals connect. It even seems
that a singular life might do without any individuality,
without any other concomitant that individualizes it. For
example, very small children all resemble one another
and have hardly any individuality, but they have
singularities: a smile, a gesture, a funny face—not
subjective qualities. Small children, through all their
sufferings and weaknesses, are infused with an
immanent life that is pure power and even bliss. 17
Singularities connect with each other in a way very different from how
individuals connect. What’s the difference? Deleuze continues:
The indefinite aspects in a life lose all indetermination to
the degree that they fill out a plane of immanence or,
what amounts to the same thing, to the degree that they
constitute the elements of a transcendental field
(individual life, on the other hand, remains inseparable
from empirical determinations). 18
It is a question of how connections are made (or not made), or perhaps, a
question of unmooring the individual life from its usual constitutive—its
empirical—determinations. It is a question of recognizing procedures or
practices that disengage a life from its accustomed bearings (from its
moorings in everyday experience) and give intimations of what I referred to
a while ago as “inadequations” with the field of consciousness and its objects.
I would like to suggest that Kofman’s notion of autobiogriffure—of
which her own memoir can be read as an example—is such a practice (a
textual practice) of disengaging the individual and her life from its empirical
coordinates, and resituating it in another field, with other subterranean

17
18

Ibid., 29-30.
Ibid., 30.
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concomitants. I am proposing, in other words, that Kofman’s autobiography
can be read as “filling out a plane of immanence.”

Autobiogriffure
“Autobiogriffures” is the title of one of Kofman’s works, in which she
reads a work of fiction by E.T.A. Hoffmann, The Life and Opinions of the Tomcat
Murr. 19 The word “autobiogriffures” is a play on autobio-“graphie” (writing),
griffe – which can mean a claw (such as a cat’s) or a stamp (in the sense of a
label) or signature, griffer which means to scratch or claw or stamp one’s
signature (the way a cat would “write”), griffonage which means scrawl or
scribble, and greffe, which means ‘graft.’ Kofman coins the term to refer to the
tomcat’s autobiography that is interspersed with and grafted upon (and thus
mockingly interrupts) the biography of Johannes Kreisler in Hoffmann’s
Tomcat Murr.
In a 1986 interview with Roland Jaccard, Kofman likens herself to
Murr in her ambivalent desire to write her life:
I have devoted to Tomcat Murr, by Hoffmann, a text,
Autobiogriffures. I am like the Tomcat Murr, whose
autobiography is only an assemblage of citations from
various authors. He seeks to affirm his identity through
this autobiography, but he does not realize that he loses
it precisely through writing. 20
Kofman here is acknowledging an inescapable paradox of autobiographic
writing: that the act of appropriation—of events, of memories, of other texts—
is at the same time an act of disappropriation of the self. The risk of losing a
sense of the boundaries of the self is inherent in autobiography due to the
citationality of all writing. And yet, despite the elusiveness of this self that
she seeks to affirm, despite the fact that she doubts the viability of this desire
to affirm one’s identity through an autobiography, despite the fact that she is
aware that this desire could very well be merely illusory, still, Kofman admits
to feeling a need to write her life:
I have come to a moment where I feel the necessity to
write a biographic “autobiogriffure” which would not
simply be an autobiography through texts. I feel I no
19 E.T.A. Hoffmann, The Life and Opinions of the Tomcat Murr, trans. by Anthea Bell
(London: Penguin Books, 1999).
20 Sarah Kofman, “Apprendre aux hommes à tenir parole. Portrait de Sarah Kofman,”
interview with Roland Jaccard, in Le Monde (27–28 April 1986), vii.
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longer have anything to say, and yet, I feel driven to make
an autobiography that would be myself. But this myself, is it
not an illusion? Is it not an illusion to believe that I have
an autobiography other than that which shows through
my bibliography? 21
Assuming that Kofman writes her autobiography with a self-conscious
awareness of this paradox and the unavoidable grafting that constitutes
autobiographic writing and with a Nietzschean wariness about the
truthfulness of our self-representations, we could apply Kofman’s own
notion of autobiogriffure to the reading of her own autobiography.
In Autobiogriffures, Kofman contrasts the linearity of the tomcat’s
autobiography with the disrupted biography of the composer Johannes
Kreisler, and shows how the cat’s autobiography mocks man’s 22 claim to
superiority over the animal on the basis of his rationality:
… the writing of Murr is linear, it is the telling of a
biography, which has a beginning, birth, and an end,
death (reported in a note by the editor…). Rigorous
continuity of the Murr pages, the points of suspension
which “begin” each page only the mark of the
provisional and contingent suspension of the text of the
cat by the text of the man. Therefore a linear
autobiography, parodying the strict order of
consciousness: the order of the story which is that of a
novel of “formation” which follows the individual from
his birth until his death, passing through the detours of
an education which leads him away from his birthplace,
to confront the hazards of the world and to come up
against them, before returning home, having acquired
by experience, wisdom and reason. 23
This is one way “to tell the story of [one’s] life.” As Kofman argues in
Autobiogriffures, the convention parodically employed by Murr is aimed at
constructing a narrative of the formation of the great man, the man of genius.

Ibid.
My use of the masculine here is intentional, since the leitmotif of the “grand homme”
is a gendered notion. The unmasking of man’s suppressed and misrecognized appropriation of
what he takes to be the feminine is a recurring theme in many of Kofman’s readings of various
authors, such as Rousseau, Comte, and Freud.
23 Sarah Kofman, Autobiogriffures. Du Chat Murr d’Hoffmann, 2nd ed. (Paris: Éditions
Galilée, 1984), 93. Translation mine.
21
22
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It intends to paint a portrait of an exemplary life that has succeeded in
educating animality into “wisdom and reason.” This narrative of cultivation
(Bildung) transforms Murr into a hero to be emulated by others. It interprets
his childhood as the precursor to the flowering of genius in his adulthood. In
the following passage, Kofman points out how Murr retroactively endows
the events of his childhood—even of his infancy—with the significance of a
hidden, nascent destiny, the destiny of the “grand homme”:
Thus, Murr, like all heroes, barely escapes death, at the
moment of his birth: twice. The first time, thanks to his
mother, when his father, like Kronos, wanted to devour
him; the second, thanks to Master Abraham, when he
almost drowned ….
To be saved twice, is that not the sign that one is
born under a lucky star? Is this not the sign of a brilliant
hidden destiny? 24
Like Murr, Kofman as a child was saved from death during the war.
Might we read in Kofman’s confession that she “had always wanted to tell
the story of [her] life,” 25 and to have wanted to tell it in a continuous, linear
story, without any gaps, a confession to a desire to decipher in her own life a
destiny that would, in effect, save her life by giving it significance? If so, then
conversely, Kofman’s rejection of the ideal of the linear, continuous narration
of her life would imply relinquishing the fantasy of a hidden destiny. It would
also mean questioning the narrative of the “grand homme,” who can only be
raised to the height of greatness at the expense of a reductive reading of his
life and childhood, a reading that determines in Hegelian fashion the essential
elements while discarding its contradictory and unsublateable aspects on the
grounds that these are merely contingent and accidental.
From a Deleuzian standpoint, Kofman’s notion of autobiography, the
autobiogriffure, can be seen as a mode of writing that seeks to descend to the
singularity of a life by shaking it loose from its moorings in the narrative of
the “grand homme,” the narrative of destiny that culminates in the
affirmation of the individual’s identity. Rather than presenting a sustained
narrative that explains her struggles and the decisions that have defined the
person she has become, in other words, rather than bestowing upon her life a
unified meaning, Rue Ordener, Rue Labat offers its readers only a fragmentary

Ibid., 97.
Sarah Kofman, “‘My Life’ and Psychoanalysis,” trans. by Georgia Albert, in Selected
Writings, ed. by Thomas Albrecht, Georgia Albert, and Elizabeth G. Rottenberg (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2007), 250–51.
24
25
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account that hints at what in Kofman’s life remains unnamed, unsettled, and
would perhaps remain undone.
I think it is utterly significant to note that when Sarah Kofman finally
writes her memoir, she devotes it only to the tumultuous years of her
childhood, beginning with the arrest and deportation of her father to
Auschwitz and centering on the ensuing trauma of being caught between her
mother and the woman who hid them during the German occupation. She
does not provide much of an account of her adolescence and early adulthood
except for brief anecdotes about her difficulties with her mother and, more
frequently, of keeping in touch with Mémé as she marks time with a
recitation—all within the last chapter—of where she lived and studied until
she entered the École Normale Supérieure. At this point, Kofman writes,
“another life begins” and she closes her memoir with the death of Mémé.
Rue Ordener, Rue Labat retains the sense of unreality that surrounds
childhood memory. Rather than employing a strictly continuous and linear
narrative, the very short chapters read like a series of vignettes with faded
backgrounds. Remembered fragments follow the tangled paths of memory; a
memory conjured by some detail in the current temporal frame evokes
another memory from either a more remote or recent past.
For all its brevity and the sparseness of its narration, Rue Ordener, Rue
Labat is anything but a simple account of a childhood. Rather than giving the
impression that it states Kofman’s “bare truths,” the restraint in Kofman’s
writing style surrounds her words with the silence of things that remain
unsaid. The tone of the memoir is that of someone who feels compelled to
testify to the truths of one’s past and to mourn the losses—still unbearable—
that have been suffered.
In Kofman’s memoir, what is said serves as a screen that keeps the
intolerable at bay. For example, immediately after the chapter recounting the
court battle between Kofman’s mother and Mémé, where her mother accused
Mémé of “having tried to ‘take advantage’” of Sarah and where Sarah in turn
betrayed her mother by testifying (truthfully enough) that her mother had
been beating her, Kofman breaks her narration with two apparently
parenthetical chapters, both dealing with the substitution of the bad for the
good mother and the confusion between the two. Chapter XVIII speaks of
Leonardo da Vinci’s drawing, the Madonna and Child with St. Anne, and
Chapter XIX, of Alfred Hitchcock’s film, The Lady Vanishes. These chapters can
be said to function as an introduction to the years of her anguished
relationship with her two mothers, but they also forestall a direct
confrontation with the painful event that had just been narrated, allowing
Kofman to speak of her trauma indirectly.
By inserting these two chapters, Kofman is breaking the continuity of
the narration of her childhood. Citing da Vinci (as well as Freud, who
© 2020 Jean Emily P. Tan
https://www.kritike.org/journal/issue_26/tan_june2020.pdf
ISSN 1908-7330

58

IMMANENCE AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY

analyzes this scene) and Hitchcock is, on the one hand, an act of appropriation
of these texts; but on the other hand, one can also read it as an act of
dispossession and dis-appropriation of the self. Her life is in a sense no longer
her life—it is now a footnote to Leonardo da Vinci and to Alfred Hitchcock.
These chapters interrupt and break down the consistency of her individual
identity, and resituates her childhood with other “concomitants.”
As Deleuze points out, the events, the singularities gain their
virtuality and are given their power (their power for transformation) by being
linked and divided differently, by being assembled with other singularities,
allowing them to enter into a plane—an other plane—of immanence. On this
reading, the significance of citationality in autobiographic writing is that it
invites the dissolution of a discrete individuality in order for the story or the
outlines of a particular individual, the subject of the autobiography, to
reemerge in a way that resonates with other stories of other individuals, with
other memories and other desires, in other places and at other times.

From Individuality to Singularity: Autobiography as a Testimony
According to Deleuze, “the Life of such individuality fades away in
favor of the singular life immanent to a man who no longer has a name; though
he can be mistaken for no other. A singular essence, a life….” 26 Is it possible to
reconcile such “namelessness” with the naming that occurs in the act of
commemoration that is performed by the autobiographer?
I believe so. I would argue that in Rue Ordener, Rue Labat, all the talk
of names of persons and places—publicly verifiable, especially the places—
on one hand, serve to anchor the autobiographical narrative in the empirical:
this is about the individual called Sarah Kofman. And yet, on the other hand,
once you read the autobiography, you do not meet Sarah Kofman the
philosopher, the individual born in September 14, 1934 and who would die
in October 15, 1994. You hear an interior, atopic voice. Speaking in the first
person, recalling events, remnants of impressions in simple, sparse prose, this
autobiographic voice captures what Deleuze might mean by a haecceity that
is anonymous and yet singular, “nameless” and yet “cannot be mistaken for
another.”
I would like to introduce at this point the notion of testimony, which
I would argue is at the core of this singularity that characterizes Kofman’s
autobiographic voice. It is true that in testifying, the one who speaks seeks to
make a testimony that is as precise in its details—hence, the enunciation of
names, the dating of events, the identification of places. On the surface,
testifying seems to run counter to the “fading away” of individuality and the

26

Deleuze, “Immanence,” 29. Emphasis mine.
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“loss of names.” But there is an aspect of testimony that makes it an exemplar
of singularity: the one who testifies is irreplaceable. And the one who testifies
is testifying to an event that has vanished, to an event whose existence is
precariously guarded by the testimony. The voice that testifies is absolutely
singular, even if this testimony were to be joined by other testimonies. The
testimony is in some sense an attestation to the singular.
Kofman’s autobiography, as a memoir not just of experiences in
general, but of childhood, a traumatic childhood, is bearing witness to an
invisible universe—a virtual space. She mentions persons by name—
classmates in school, teachers—who had been kind to her. And she mentions
places in Paris—names of streets, train stations, even apartment addresses,
no matter how uncertainly remembered.
But her mother, strikingly, remains unnamed. Her father’s name is
mentioned near the beginning of her memoir, when the police come to arrest
him: Rabbi Berek Kofman. Siblings, teachers, Mémé’s lover Paul, even her
rival, another girl also taken care of by Mémé, are named, but not her mother.
Although it is true that her substitute mother, whom she calls Mémé, is also
never properly named, Kofman does mention that her saint (and possibly
namesake) is Claire.
The woman who saved her, and at the same time wounded her most
deeply, is first referred to as “the Lady of Rue Labat” and then later on as
“Mémé.” But her mother’s name is never given. She is always called “my
mother.” This suggests that while the opening of Rue Ordener, Rue Labat
draws the reader’s attention to her father’s broken pen to signify what she
had been wanting to write about, perhaps, what was truly intolerable for
Kofman, what which she could not bring herself to speak about 27 was not the
death of her father but her separation from her mother. It is as if in this book,
the nameless mother becomes an emblem for the vanishing point at which
anonymity gives way to absolute singularity. Perhaps, one can only bear
witness to the absolute singularity of a being or an experience by hovering
about it wordlessly.
Thus, Kofman substitutes the names of the streets for the names of
the two women—her mothers. The streets, train lines and stations, the
landmarks in Paris and in the countryside plotted the virtual landscape of her
childhood. Recalling a fateful night in February 1943, when because of a

27 Rue Ordener, Rue Labat begins with these words: “Of him all I have left is the fountain
pen. I took it one day from my mother’s purse, where she kept it along with some other souvenirs
of my father. It is a kind of pen no longer made, the kind you have to fill with ink. I used it all
through school. It ‘failed’ me before I could bring myself to give it up. I still have it, patched up
with Scotch tape; it is right in front of me on my desk and makes me write, write.
“Maybe all my books have been the detours required to bring me to write about
‘that.’” Kofman, Rue Ordener, Rue Labat, 3.
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warning that there would be a roundup, she and her mother had to flee their
apartment to seek refuge in the Lady of Rue Labat, Kofman writes:
The Metro stop separates the Rue Ordener from the Rue
Labat. Between the two, Rue Marcadet; it seemed
endless to me, and I vomited the whole way. 28

Autobiography and Virtuality
Kofman’s autobiography, a sparse, discontinuous, discrete testament
to the persons and events of her childhood, is an act of dispossession. Nearly
the last book she would publish, it is a book in which, as Ann Smock (who
translated this book to English) puts it, Kofman was able to “turn toward a
sort of knot in her past, into which her heart was tied.” 29 But if she was able
to turn towards this knot, it was not in order to unravel it and attain the
illumination of an explanation. Smock describes the lucidity of Kofman’s
autobiography in this way:
… bathed in a lucidity unclouded by insight. No sense
of understanding or ultimate resolution—no relief, no
consolation whatsoever—mars it. It is clear. 30
Through the simplicity of its style, Rue Ordener, Rue Labat bares an old wound
with utmost discretion; without the support of an edifying purpose. without
offering lessons on how suffering is to be overcome, and without even the
support of her usual (anti-)philosophical style. Speaking of the “high-spirited
Nietzschean malice” in Kofman’s philosophical writings, and contrasting this
with the tone of Rue Ordener, Rue Labat, Ann Smock observes that:
She liked to play the role of the mocking girl whose
laughter interrupts the philosopher at his desk, scatters
his grave truths the better to greet in their stead beautiful
fictions, uncanny signs, and figures ‘devilishly
deceptive.’ That splendid mask of insolently feminine
brilliance is not apparent at all in Rue Ordener, Rue Labat,
which, I would say, does without literary qualities.

Ibid., 31.
Ann Smock, Translator’s Introduction to Rue Ordener, Rue Labat, xi.
30 Ibid., xii.
28
29
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It is simple, but it does not have a simple style or
any style. You would not say of it “well written” or “a
good story.” Fortunately, it exists and is plainly legible. 31
In this book, Sarah Kofman speaks, and yet not in the way that say, Nietzsche
speaks in “Ecce Homo.” Yes, it is confessional, for it opens with an admission:
“Maybe all my books have been the detours required to bring me to write
about ‘that.’” 32 But rather than offering an explanation of how one becomes
what one is, hers is more of a confession of all that is unresolved in her life. It
is as if Kofman were saying, “Perhaps, this is what I could not bring myself
to write about, and so I wrote all those other books instead ….”
Kofman’s autobiography is an act of dispossession of mastery over
her own life. In Deleuzian terms, it undoes the markers of Kofman’s
individuality—her style, her status as a philosopher, an analyst of Nietzsche
and Freud. Using a fragmentary structure, it disavows the genre of the
biography of the grand homme and descends to a plane of immanence. By
entering the wound of her childhood—by opening up an old wound—
Kofman renounces the fiction of the life that has progressed into maturity,
found its destiny, and in which one has “become what one is.” Just at the
point where, in all its simplicity of language and style, Sarah Kofman attains
to the singular voice of the witness to the singular experience of her
childhood, this voice becomes the anonymous voice of a life.
A life, writes Deleuze, “contains only virtuals. It is made up of
virtualities, events, singularities.” 33 And he explains virtuality by saying that
“what we call virtual is not something that lacks reality but something that is
engaged in a process of actualization following the plane that gives it its
particular reality.” 34 What exactly does Deleuze mean by virtualities?
Virtualities can only be spoken of in the most indeterminate way—which is
why the indefinite article is an index of the singular. But it is important to
note that these singularities are not purely isolated. Deleuze speaks of
virtualities as “something that is engaged in a process of actualization
following the plane that gives it its particular reality.” 35 Thinking of virtualities is
therefore, both a matter of thinking the in-between—the indeterminate, the
possible—as well as the plane of consistency that “give[s] virtual events their
full reality.” It is my understanding that in Nietzschean terms, identifying a
plane of immanence—or perhaps, more precisely, situating oneself within a
plane of immanence—would mean having a perspective.
Ibid., x–xi.
Kofman, Rue Ordener, Rue Labat, 3.
33 Deleuze, “Immanence,” 31.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid. Emphasis mine.
31
32
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As Nietzsche would put it, to live is to have a perspective. And to
have a perspective, does this not consist in placing oneself in a nexus of
“concomitants”? But not just any sort of perspective will do. The final
passages of Deleuze’s brief essay suggest that in order for us to descend to a
plane of immanence, a certain discomposure with ourselves—with our
certainties, with the organizing and individuating unity of the self—is
necessary. Which is why Deleuze identifies the plane of immanence with a
wound:
Events or singularities give to the plane all their
virtuality, just as the plane of immanence gives virtual
events their full reality. The event considered as nonactualized (indefinite) is lacking in nothing. It suffices to
put it in relation to its concomitants: a transcendental
field, a plane of immanence, a life, singularities. A wound
is incarnated or actualized in a state of things or of life; but it
is itself a pure virtuality on the plane of immanence that leads
us into a life. My wound existed before me: not a
transcendence of the wound as higher actuality, but its
immanence as a virtuality always within a milieu (plane or
field). 36
Deleuze speaks of a wound as “a pure virtuality on the plane of immanence”
and of woundedness as containing the possibility of “lead[ing] us into a life.”
“My wound existed before me”—what if we were to read this quite
literally from the standpoint of autobiography, and in particular, Kofman’s
autobiography? It would mean that trauma precedes the subject. Before the
“I” who writes the autobiography, who self-consciously thematizes one’s life
in the act of writing, is the wound—which is to say, everything in one’s
history, personal and historical, that calls for healing and saving, for some
sort of reckoning without providing the terms of its reckoning.
Because the memoir is a testament, the plane of immanence that it
fills out through the wound is a plane of possible encounters. We could thus
sketch an ethical structure of autobiography: on the side of the
autobiographer, autobiography (1) sketches the contours of a perspective—
neither an inexorable fate nor a project drawn by the individual—with which
another may resonate; and (2) bears witness to the nameless, to those who
have disappeared, but who are irreplaceable, singular. And on the side of the
reader, autobiography opens the possibility of responding with empathy, and

36

Ibid., 31–32.
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like the “others” in Dickens’ work, with “eagerness, respect,” or perhaps,
“even love” for an elusive and singular life revealed in the text.
Finally, what of the relation between autobiography and philosophy?
The autobiography is a wound of philosophy. It enables philosophers to sink
beneath the terrain of conceptualization in order to find traces of
inadequation, of dissonance between consciousness and its field.
Department of Philosophy, Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines
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